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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alesha Ann Green appeals from the Judgment dismissing her Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal, Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it
addressed the potential conflict of interest in her case, because it did not adequately
inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of
prejudice.

Ms. Green’s trial counsel in the underlying criminal case and her post-

conviction counsel worked for the same public defender’s office, and Ms. Green’s postconviction petition raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.
The district court recognized there was a potential conflict of interest, but it did not
adequately inquire into whether the circumstances of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a
significant likelihood of prejudice.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Ada County No. CR 2012-6591, Ms. Green was convicted by a jury of two
counts of felony trafficking in methamphetamine.

(See R., p.29.)

At the trial, an

attorney from the Ada County Public Defender’s Office represented Ms. Green. (See
R., p.49.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with five years
fixed, on the first count, and a concurrent unified sentence of twelve years, with three
years fixed, on the second count.

(R., p.29.)

At the sentencing hearing, another

attorney from the Ada County Public Defender’s Office represented Ms. Green. (See
R., pp.154-55 (sentencing hearing transcript).) Ms. Green appealed, and the Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed her sentence in an unpublished opinion. State v. Green, No.
42452, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 506 (Idaho Ct. App. May 28, 2015).
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Ms. Green filed, pro se, a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.4-8.)

The petition raised the following grounds for relief:

“(a) Ineffective

[counsel]”; “(b) Mishandling of evidence. Lack of evidence”; and “(c) Untrue testimony
of detectives.”

(R., p.5.)

Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

Ms. Green asserted her trial counsel failed to get any of her witnesses on her behalf, did
not show up for the sentencing hearing, failed to thoroughly research and present
evidence that could have helped her prove her innocence, and did not properly
interrogate witnesses, i.e., on mishandling of evidence and perjured testimony of
witnesses. (R., p.6.)
Ms. Green also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of
Counsel. (R., pp.17-20.) The district court granted the motion and appointed the Ada
County Public Defender to represent Ms. Green in the post-conviction proceeding.
(R., pp.21-22.)

The order granting the motion for appointment of counsel stated that

“[b]ecause the petition for post-conviction relief . . . includes an allegation of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, the Ada County Public Defender may choose to appoint
conflict counsel.” (R., p.21.)
A third attorney from the Ada County Public Defender was assigned to
Ms. Green’s case as post-conviction counsel. (See R., p.23.) The district court then set
a status conference.

(R., pp.25-26.)

The district court’s order setting the status

conference noted “[a]s of the date of this order, no notice of appearance has been
entered by conflict counsel for petitioner.” (R., p.25.)
At the status conference, the following exchange occurred between the district
court and post-conviction counsel:
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[THE COURT:] And, [post-conviction counsel], are you appearing on
behalf of petitioner?
[POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:] I am, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So you have not actually sent that out for conflict
counsel? And I assume that’s because you were not the trial attorney.
[POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:] That’s what my boss tells me, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.6-15.)
The district court later inquired at the status conference:
[THE COURT:] [Post-conviction counsel], have you discussed with
Ms. Green that you, as a member of the Ada County Public Defender’s
Office, are representing her in this action?
[POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:] I have, Your Honor. I had [a] chance
to visit her last week.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.17-22.) Post-conviction counsel then discussed his review of the case so
far and how much additional time he would need to prepare an amended postconviction petition.

(See Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.24.)

The district court gave post-

conviction counsel seven weeks to file an amended petition. (Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10,
L.11.)
Ms. Green, through post-conviction counsel, then filed an Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief.

(R., pp.29-32.)

The amended petition raised the following

grounds for relief: “(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel”; “(b) Mishandling of evidence
and lack thereof”; “(c) Untrue testimony of detectives”; and “(d) Failure to convey plea
deal from State.” (R., p.30.) Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Ms. Green asserted counsel failed to get any of her witnesses on her behalf, did not

3

show up for the sentencing hearing, failed to thoroughly research and present evidence
that could have helped her prove her innocence, did not properly interrogate witnesses,
i.e., on mishandling of evidence and perjured testimony of witnesses, and failed to fully
explain the new offer from the State. (R., p.30.)
The State filed an Answer to the amended petition. (R., pp.35-36.) The State
also filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and Exhibits, arguing the amended petition
raised no genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.37-38.)

As an exhibit, the State

attached the transcript of Ms. Green’s jury trial and sentencing hearing. (R., pp.39-162
(State’s Ex. 1).)
In its Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, the State argued
Ms. Green’s claims were bare and conclusory. (R., pp.163-70.) On the claim that
Ms. Green’s trial counsel was ineffective for not appearing at her sentencing hearing,
the State argued Ms. Green did not articulate specifically why the second attorney who
appeared at the hearing performed deficiently, the record contradicted her claim of
prejudice because Ms. Green indicated at the hearing she was comfortable with going
forward with the second attorney, and the Idaho Court of Appeals had affirmed her
sentences.

(R., pp.166-67.)

Regarding the claim that Ms. Green’s counsel was

ineffective for failing to get any witnesses or evidence contrary to the State’s charges,
the State contended Ms. Green did not identify what evidence or which witnesses
counsel failed to present, did not articulate how or why the evidence or testimony would
have affected the outcome of her trial, and did not provide the district court with a copy
of the security footage or show any resulting prejudice from the failure to present the
footage. (R., pp.167-68.)
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On the claim that Ms. Green’s counsel was ineffective for not properly
interrogating witnesses, the State argued Ms. Green did not identify which witnesses
were not questioned properly or what questions counsel should have asked, and she
did not articulate how or why the evidence or testimony would have affected the
outcome of her trial. (R., p.168.) With respect to the claim that Ms. Green’s counsel
was ineffective for failing to fully explain a new plea offer from the State, the State
argued Ms. Green did not identify what new offer was not fully explained, and she did
not articulate how or why the failure to explain the new offer would have affected the
outcome of her trial. (R., p.169.) Thus, the State requested the district court grant its
motion for summary disposition. (R., p.169.)
The district court subsequently issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R., pp.17375.) In the notice, the district court gave notice of “its intent to dismiss the . . . amended
petition for post-conviction relief for the reasons set forth in Respondent’s . . . motion for
summary disposition.” (R., p.173.) The district court granted Ms. Green twenty days to
reply to the proposed dismissal of the post-conviction action. (R., p.174.) However,
Ms. Green did not file a reply. (See R., pp.2-3 (register of actions).) The district court
then issued a Judgment dismissing the amended petition. (R., pp.176-77.)
Ms. Green filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment.
(R., pp.178-80.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it addressed the potential conflict of interest in
Ms. Green’s case, because it did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances
demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Addressed The Potential Conflict Of Interest In
Ms. Green’s Case, Because It Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The
Circumstances Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice
A.

Introduction
Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict

of interest in her case, because it did not adequately inquire into whether the
circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.

The district court

recognized there was a potential conflict of interest because Ms. Green’s trial counsel
and post-conviction counsel both worked for the same office and Ms. Green’s petition
raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.

However, the

district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a
significant likelihood of prejudice, because it did not ask post-conviction counsel
questions such as whether his office had set up effective measures to prevent
communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of
individual defendants.
B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay court costs and expenses of

representation, “these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be
made available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court . . .
and paid, on order of the district court.” I.C. § 19-4904. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held “[t]he decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the
discretion of the district court.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). At
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least in the context of criminal cases, the appointment of substitute counsel (on grounds
of, for example, a conflict of interest) is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1
See State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional or statutory right to
counsel in post-conviction proceedings.

Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 394-95

(2014). However, the Idaho Court of Appeals before Murphy held that, while a postconviction petitioner did not have a constitutionally protected right to counsel, the
petitioner “had an interest in securing assistance to adequately present his claims.” See
Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing this interest in the
context of procedural due process).
C.

The District Court Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The Circumstances
Of Ms. Green’s Case Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice
Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict

of interest in her case, because the district court did not adequately inquire into whether
the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.
Ms. Green submits her interest in securing assistance to adequately present her
post-conviction claims extends to an interest in having conflict-free post-conviction
counsel. Under the statutory standard for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, if
a petitioner alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court

When a district court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted with the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

1
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should appoint counsel to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and
“properly allege the necessary supporting facts.” See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.
The opportunity for the petitioner to work with post-conviction counsel and properly
allege the necessary supporting facts for the petitioner’s possibly-valid claims would be
negated if counsel had a conflict of interest limiting counsel’s ability to represent the
petitioner.
The right to conflict-free counsel in criminal cases “derives from the Sixth
Amendment as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003). “Whenever a trial court
knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has
a duty of inquiry.” Id. (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981); Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). Ms. Green does not assert the constitutional right
to conflict-free counsel in criminal cases applies to post-conviction proceedings such as
the instant case. But by analogy to the constitutional standard, and to preserve the
petitioner’s opportunity to work with post-conviction counsel, see Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793, a district court should inquire into potential conflicts of interest in postconviction matters.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held “[t]o determine whether an actual conflict of
interest exists, Idaho Courts look to the standards set forth in the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 705 (2009). The Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct provide that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a).
A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation
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of one or more client will be materially limited . . . by the personal interests of the lawyer
. . . .” Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2). The comments for Rule 1.7 state “[t]he lawyer’s
own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a
client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in
serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached
advice.” Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. 10.
Generally, under Rule 1.10, a lawyer’s concurrent conflicts of interest are
imputed to his or her entire firm. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a). As an exception to
the general rule, if the conflict is based on the lawyer’s personal interest, the conflict will
be imputed to the lawyer’s entire firm if it “present[s] a significant risk of materially
limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.” See Idaho
R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a)(1).
Additionally, Idaho’s appellate courts have held there is no per se rule imputing
one public defender’s conflict of interest to the public defender’s entire office. Severson,
147 Idaho at 706; State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 794 (Ct. App. 2007). Rather, the
preferred approach is “to analyze whether one public defender’s conflict should be
imputed to the entire office on a case-by-case basis.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 706
(citing Cook, 144 Idaho at 794). The relevant inquiry is “whether the circumstances
demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). “If so, there is a presumption
that both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will arise.”
quotation marks omitted).
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Id. (internal

Here, the district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances
of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice. The district court
recognized there was a potential conflict of interest. Ms. Green’s trial counsel and postconviction counsel both worked for the Ada County Public Defender’s Office. (See, e.g.,
R., pp.23, 49.) Ms. Green’s post-conviction petition raised ineffective assistance of
counsel claims against trial counsel.

(R., pp.5-6.)

Thus, the district court’s order

granting the motion for appointment of counsel provided that “[b]ecause the petition for
post-conviction relief . . . includes an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
the Ada County Public Defender may choose to appoint conflict counsel.” (R., p.21.)
The district further acknowledged the existence of a potential conflict by mentioning
conflict counsel in the order setting the status conference. (See R., p.25.)
But even though it recognized the potential conflict, the district court did not
adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood
of prejudice. At the status conference, the district court simply asked post-conviction
counsel: “So you have not actually sent that out for conflict counsel? And I assume
that’s because you were not the trial attorney.” (Tr., p.6, Ls.9-12.) The district court
then accepted post-conviction counsel’s answer: “That’s what my boss tells me, Your
Honor.” (See Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.) The only other question on the potential conflict came
when the district court asked post-conviction counsel if he had discussed with
Ms. Green that he was representing her while working for the Ada County Public
Defender’s Office, and post-conviction counsel answered in the affirmative.
Tr., p.8, Ls.17-22.)
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(See

Thus, the district court conducted nothing more than a superficial inquiry into
whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.

For

example, the district court did not inquire into “whether [the] office has set up effective
measures to prevent communication of confidential client information between lawyers
employed on behalf of individual defendants.” See Severson, 147 Idaho at 707 (quoting
Cook, 144 Idaho at 794 n.8) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without asking such
deeper questions that would allow the district court to take the individual situations of
Ms. Green and her counsel into consideration, see Cook, 144 Idaho at 794, the district
court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a
significant likelihood of prejudice.
The district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances of
Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.

Because the

district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict of interest, the judgment
dismissing Ms. Green’s amended post-conviction petition should be vacated and the
matter should be remanded to the district court for a proper conflict determination. If the
district court determines there is a conflict of interest imputed to post-conviction counsel,
Ms. Green should receive conflict-free counsel to preserve her opportunity to work with
counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts for her post-conviction
claims. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Green respectfully requests this Court vacate the
judgment dismissing her amended post-conviction petition and remand her case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of March, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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